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OPEN DISCUSSION
THE CHAIRMAN: Another gauntlet thrown. Any responses?
MR. McDONALD: I understand the umbrage that Jessica [Litman] takes to method of access and method of pricing and that sort of
thing. I deal with a group of folks who are creative and quite frankly if
things changed, then, they would probably.find a way of dealing with
it. But as you have contemplated these various notions, let's say if the
law you described was passed, they have still got the basics of economics, that they expend a certain amount of resources and they are going
to find some other way of recouping those resources.
How do you envision that part of it would work? I mean they are
going to come up with a new pricing and new distribution scheme to
accommodate these changes. What do you think that pricing and distribution scheme would look like? I hate this answer in case it works out
that way.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: Well, first of all, I am not, I suppose,
supposing that Congress simply would pass a law saying we hereby preempt all state contract and trade secrecy law, but rather trying to put
in place a federal statute that provides an alternative to recoup costs,
but at the same time prohibits using this particular strategy for recouping costs. That is, I think that a world in which all those contracts are
taken seriously is a good deal worse than the world we had before
Feist.
In terms of, I mean I think under the Commerce Clause it is probably, but not without doubt, constitutional to pass an INS-type statute.
And that that would-if what it is that database proprietors are concerned about is that their users may download the database and market
a competing database, then if they have a right as against their competitors, a right to enjoin competitive use of data flowing from their
database, then perhaps it doesn't cut into anybody's profits that they
have to stop incidentally monitoring all of the rest of us, who aren't
going to go into competition and would just as soon nobody keep very
close records or charge us lots of money or tell us that we can't report
to our next door neighbor what fact we learned on that database this
morning.
PROFESSOR PATTERSON: One of the things that concerns me
is what I call the Chicken Little syndrome on the part of the copyright
entrepreneurs who come out with that the sky will fall unless you do
not give us the protection we want and desire, and so the result is that
copyright law is becoming a series of legal subsidies to guarantee profit
for copyright entrepreneurs.
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I think we need to step back and see what the market can do for
these people. I am absolutely confident that the movie producers and
Sony were absolutely convinced that their market for video cassettes
was gone, and today where does the major income for movies come
from? It comes from the sale and rental of video cassettes.
I think we-copyright entrepreneurs often suffer from, I suppose a
bit of myopia induced by self-interest, and I think it is footnote 13 in
Sony that is relevant whereby the comment was made in the monopoly
of copyright and patents the tendency to extend everything to its ultimate limit and beyond is operating here.
I suppose one example is the. matter of copying an article or a
page in part consumes. I suppose one of my pet peeves here is the
Copyright Clearance Center that says you have got to send me fifty
cents every time you want to copy a page of a copyrighted compilation.
Well, the factor that people are overlooking is that the ease of copying
often results in what I call convenience copying that is going to have no
economic impact on the copyrighted book at all. And what the copyright proprietors want is to be able to charge a fee to get additional
income from the secondary market when, in fact, copyright I think is
constitutionally limited to the primary market.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I think there is some ambiguity in the
discussion here and I would like to turn to Jessica [Litman] and ask
her, did I correctly understand you to say if this statute were drafted to
relate only and to control only the conduct between competitors; that
is, it would not be actionable until the person who downloaded then
made a commercial product and entered into competition.
So there are two subjects of this legislation, and I take it your
principal concern was to the user who never had a record of-the two
are getting merged in this discussion. I think we should unbundle that.
If I understand you, if it were addressed to competitors, you would
not find it unpalatable to have such a statute.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: The difficulty is you don't know in advance who is going to turn into tomorrow's competitor. If you are using
contractual restrictions in monitoring the use of the database, in order
that you can enforce them against the person who tomorrow competes
with you, you have got to look at all of us.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: I am willing to look but do you think
that is a realistic prospect that Mr. Schatz is going to tell WESTLAW
to sue me because I am becoming an active user all of a sudden and
they know where I am and they have my number? So I think we should
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/25
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PROFESSOR LITMAN: I think they are going to make a list of
what you access, and I think at one point or another they are going to
sell your name to someone who sells other kinds of products.
PROFESSOR PATTERSON: I am not so sure they would not
sue him to make an example if that happens frequently.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: What would their damages be?
PROFESSOR PATTERSON: They would not want damages, but
an injunction, a rule of law.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: That would keep me from being a subscriber? But, maybe. But it seems to me that is what is at issue here.
So, there is the societal interest in the individual. That is what I am
wanting to unbundle and to access to knowledge for scholars and learning and building and so on. But there is also the societal interest in
having some order in the marketplace and not letting people come
against each other, and those two societal interests should be addressed
separately.
MR. STEELE: I think one thing we clearly agree on is that contracts are increasingly becoming much more important. I also think
you were right that the publishing and information industry would not
be content to discard its contractual apparatus in return for some sort
of new statutory scheme.
I believe you and I are looking at a world through two different
looking glasses, and I guess I trust the marketplace a little bit more
than you do. Capitalism, somebody said, is a very messy form of economy; however, compared to what we have seen happen to other types of
economic organizations, capitalism looks like an attractive and fruitful
way of organizing how we engage in economic transactions.
To start with, there are many incentives to create information.
You have many people searching to find market niches where information is needed. You have many publishers working hard to drive costs
down so that selling prices can be lowered. I think the end result is that
an enormous amount of information is available.
I realize, of course, that none of this works perfectly and there will
be disconnects. There will be researchers, for example, who walk in the
library and find out that what they used to get for free ten years ago
now costs $1.00. But somebody has to pay the cost of creating and
distributing information, maybe individual researchers should not have
to pay for a particular licensed use, but maybe their universities should.
Fundamentally, I find revolutionary any discussion of a statutorily
mandated dismantling of our right to contract. This discussion clearly
reflects that we all view information as very important. If you had
made the same proposal about how to buy cars, clothes or food, howPublished
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PROFESSOR GORDON: Part of your response seems to be that
you are not sure if this system works or not. I can understand what you
are saying. So this is offered by way of friendly amendment [to Professor Litman].
You are worried about two things. One is the abstract value of the
First Amendment and the other is invasion of privacy of the kind explored in Orwells' 1984. Let us put the First Amendment aside for a
moment.
Looking at the 1984 concerns, you are really not worried about
Mead Data figuring out ahead of time what we are doing, rather, we
are worried about Mead Data selling information about us to other
persons who might be misusing it. So one way to deal with this without
dismantling anything might be a narrowing of.the privacy statute saying things like online computer companies can keep records of what
their customers do for no longer than thirty days after the bill is paid.
That might look more revolutionary as a statute since it is inhibiting
certain kinds of self help, but it -speaks directly to the problem. It might
appeal more honestly to the privacy issue at stake and therefore get
more popular support; in any event some sort of direct ruling coming
from Congress like that might conceivably work.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: Then the question is, and I think online
database proprietors could ask legitimately: "Look, we have got to be
able to keep track of and monitor stuff for more than thirty days because for some of us, the danger that someone will on the thirty-first
day be able to make use of data downloaded from us in a product that
competes with us is very real." Not everything sort of passes out of
utility in the month, and so if there is any kind of exception to allow
legitimate enforcement of contractual restrictions, it is going to swallow
up whole.
PROFESSOR GORDON: I have a question.
PROFESSOR RASKIND: Can I interrupt and pose one back to
you [Professor Gordon]. Isn't the problem wider? All of us belong to
professional associations. You may belong, I do, to the American Economics Association. They sell their lists of-Hertz paid them I forget
how much for the list of all their members so they could send a card to
every member that said we will give you a discount if you show this
when you go to rent a car at the airport. So the moral of computers has
invaded our rights and gave economic value to our names and addresses
in all varieties of ways, and if you draft a privacy statute, you will have
to address that as well as all these database folks.
PROFESSOR GORDON: A privacy statute that discouraged the
sale of mailing lists? I think it would be wonderful if I got less junk
mail. But there are further First Amendment questions, though. For
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/25
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example, it may make a big difference to someone who is fighting for
unregulated birth control advice to know who is a member of NOW
[National Organization for Women], and NOW members may want
such advocates to be able to find that out. So I am not sure exactly how
I come down on that, but I do think a privacy statute might be a better
way. That was just offered by way of friendly amendment hereby
rejected.
One last question. Remember when I asked David Carson about
what his First Amendment position was and the gentleman up there
[Mr. Sheils] and they both gave us the protectionism argument about
why the First Amendment really was not violated?
Your [Professor Litman's] answer in response to them is partially
to draw a vivid 1984 picture, which is not directly implicated by the
copyright sort of concerns, and second to talk about the symbolic value
of the First Amendment. What I would like to ask you to do is draw
some more vivid pictures or doctrinal arguments about why the First
Amendment is indeed implicated when you have a federal or state regime that allows anti-copying rights to be granted to individual proprietors of facts.
PROFESSOR LITMAN: In five minutes or less. We have had-I
mean I think my view is pretty idiosyncratic. One of the things in this
case that I was disappointed in, in Justice O'Connor's analysis, is that
the reason we do not protect facts is that they are not original, which
has led to a discussion all through here about: "Well, what about these
original things? They must not be facts." Because I think most facts
are original, most facts are absolutely the product of a great deal of
brain power. And I think we don't protect them for a completely different reason, the same reason we don't protect ideas, which is that while
they may well be original, they are too important. We need them to
talk about.
We need to be able to talk about facts and, therefore, we do not
protect them under the copyright statute. The fact that the copyright
statute does not protect facts and ideas is why everybody says we do
not have to worry about a First Amendment problem in a statute that
authorizes the enjoining and shredding of protected expression because
copyright does not give you any protection in facts and ideas.
I think whenever you give property protection to facts and ideas,
then you do not have that particular out to say there is no First
Amendment problem, and you do not have the other kinds of outs that
we have been talking about, I mean. So I think it poses a fairly significant, both symbolic and probably practical, First Amendment problem.
That series of First Amendment problems is going to depend again on
what by
kind
of data 1991
it is We are talking about not letting you use, since
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we are more comfortable with certain kinds of proprietary data than
we are with others.
PROFESSOR KARJALA: Looking at this question of why the
market does not work from the other end, at least for part of these
things, I wonder if it makes any difference in your analysis whether the
facts that you are worried about protecting are independently discoverable or not. Because, fundamentally, once an idea is published, it is
hard to prove independent creation in a copyright situation. Once you
have had access to it, it is kind of hard to show you could have done it
independently. And some facts-what was going on in President Ford's
mind, for example-are not independently discoverable. Protection for
the acquisition of those facts is essentially protection of the facts themselves and that is troublesome.
But I wonder, isn't less troublesome if you have got a collection of
relatively mundane facts? It is still a lot of work to collect them and
put them in a database, but isn't the problem a little bit different? If
the original collector put too many restrictions on your use of the collection, what is to stop somebody else from going out and collecting the
same facts and-competing? What is to stop the market from working
with respect to databases that contain only generally available facts, so
that all we are talking about is the effort involved. Then, isn't protection less troublesome, not for the facts themselves, but the collection
effort?
PROFESSOR LANGE: Put it another way. Don't you just have
to say "Coase" and stop; isn't that really what you are arguing? In
other words, aren't we generally better off in a setting like this to allow
ourselves to negotiate our way around these problems with all the flexibility that accompanies that kind of freedom to negotiate, if indeed we
really take his [Mr. Sheils'] place, seriously, to be fair,' and know
meanwhile that we have got some really heavy duty mechanisms for
allowing us to do so if he forgets, than it is to adopt an ever more
refined system of regulations that oblige us to?
PROFESSOR KARJALA: You would not have to rely on them to
be fair if the market is working. If the consumers do not like it, won't
somebody else come along and not be so heavy handed about it? I just
wonder why we do not rely on the market in that context?
MR. McDONALD: If I could, we are assuming that the information market, that information is just of one grade. And the folks that
are in the business have sort of recognized that there are certain types
of information that are actually just commodities. It does not matter
who you purchase them from and they are readily available. And the
basic thing you can charge for is the cost of the gathering. So it is a
minimum cost in the marketplace that has driven those sorts of things
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol17/iss2/25
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down. A pretty good example is mailing lists, a good name, address,
and telephone number; they are not hard to come up with, and basically what you are paying for is the cost of gathering. That is just a
combined level of information.
As you move up the scale and there is increased input into it, the
incentives to take and produce that and the need to recover the costs of
doing that take on sort of different parameters. There is a quality aspect that comes in where somebody else's products might be much better than mine. And there I think the talk about information just as one
unit, I think you have to refine your thinking a little bit. I think the
market works in both instances, but I think it works quite differently in
each.
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